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I. Introduction
This year produced three notable rulings by Utah courts and a number of
important legislative developments impacting the oil and gas industry. In
Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., the Supreme
Court of Utah answered a certified question regarding the appropriate
measure of expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease.1 In
Womack v. Womack, the Court of Appeals of Utah addressed the right of a
life tenant to the proceeds derived from an oil and gas lease.2 And in
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy v. Questar Gas Co., the
Court of Appeals considered the scope of authority of local water districts
to regulate a public utility’s natural gas pipelines located within the water
district’s non-exclusive easements. 3
In addition to the above case law, the following four bills were signed
into law: (i) Senate Bill 17 clarifies certain portions of Utah’s oil and gas
severance tax statute; (ii) Senate Bill 134 amends the act regarding the Oil
and Gas Conservation Account; (iii) Senate Bill 159 extends the exemption
from state severance tax on oil and gas; and (iv) House Bill 276 seeks to
revamp Utah’s public land management regime.
II. Case Law
A. Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co.
The most recent development in Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v.
United States Gypsum Co. involved a certified question from the Tenth
Circuit to the Supreme Court of Utah to answer the specific issue of how
expectation damages should be measured for the breach of an oil and gas
lease. 4 Prior litigation between United States Gypsum Company (“US
1.
2.
3.
4.

No. 20140453, 2016 WL 3369544, at *1 (Utah June 16, 2016).
372 P.3d 690, 691 (Utah Ct. App. 2016).
361 P.3d 709, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 2015).
No. 20140453, 2016 WL 3369544, at *1 (Utah June 16, 2016).
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Gypsum”) and Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. (“Trans-Western”) gave rise
to a dispute over the appropriate calculation of contract damages. US
Gypsum, who owned the oil and gas beneath lands in Sevier County, Utah,
granted an oil and gas lease to Trans-Western in September 2004, effective
as of August 17, 2004, the same date a prior lease then held by assignee
Wolverine was to expire. 5 A few weeks after the execution of the lease,
based on Wolverine’s assertion that its prior lease remained effective, U.S.
Gypsum rescinded the Trans-Western lease claiming a mistake of fact
regarding the validity of the Wolverine lese.6 Trans-Western then filed suit
in federal court over the alleged breach, and after early procedural hurdles
were surpassed, the district court found that U.S. Gypsum’s cancellation of
the Trans-Western lease constituted breaches of contract and the covenant
of quiet enjoyment. 7 However, the court awarded only nominal damages to
Trans-Western, and on appeal the Tenth Circuit certified this question as to
how to appropriately measure expectation damages for the breach of an oil
and gas lease under Utah law. 8
U.S. Gypsum argued that damages for breach of an oil and gas lease
should be measured as general damages for breach of a contract to sell real
estate, being the difference between the price paid for the lease and the
market value of that lease at the time of breach.9 Trans-Western, on the
other hand, asserted that the non-breaching party must be placed “‘in as
good a position as if the contract had been performed,’ and doing so
required an award for expectation damages based on an amount that it could
have sold the lease for during its term. 10 Furthermore, Trans-Western
argued that the courts should admit post-breach evidence in order to
determine an accurate amount of damages awardable.11
The Supreme Court of Utah discussed an array of relevant authority
about the nature and classifications of the oil and gas lease as a source of
both contractual rights and property interests. After reviewing the lack of
consensus among states and commentators, the court found such
distinctions to have no bearing on the measure of expectation damages. 12
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id.
12. See id. at *3-4 (“[W]e do not see that the specific classifications of the oil and gas
lease in various jurisdictions make any difference as to the type of expectation damages
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Instead, the court ruled that the oil and gas lease should be treated like any
other contract, the breach of which may result in an award of general and
consequential damages to the non-breaching party.
In answering this limited question, the Supreme Court of Utah held “that
the appropriate measure of expectation damages for the breach of an oil and
gas lease is much the same as the measure of expectation damages for a
breach of contract and may include both general and consequential
damages.” 13 To assess general damages for a breach of an oil and gas lease,
the court should look to the “difference between the contract price of the
lease and the market value of the lease at the time of the breach.”14 In
addition, the court may award consequential damages to be measured “by
the gains [the promised] performance could produce … or the loss that is
produced by the absence of such performance.” 15 In order to recover
consequential damages, the injured party must prove that such
consequential damages (i) were caused by the breach of the lease, (ii) were
foreseeable at the time the parties entered the contract, and (iii) are
calculable with reasonable certainty. 16 The Supreme Court of Utah further
explained that because post-breach evidence may help to establish the value
of a contract at the time of breach, trial courts may exercise discretion to
allow parties to use such evidence to establish and measure their
expectation damages. 17 Thus, “for the limited purpose of expectation
damages in a breach of contract claim, [the court] will treat oil and gas
leases as [it] would treat any other lease under Utah law.” 18
B. In re Estate of Womack
In Womack v. Womack, the Court of Appeals of Utah addressed the
timeliness of a petition to re-interpret a will, and in doing so considered the
rights of a life tenant with regard to proceeds from subsurface mineral
development. 19 Gordon Womack died in 1989 and devised to “to each of
my three children, for life, remainder to the children of each of my children
available when a contract is breached in the oil and gas context. We are aware of no
jurisdiction that has carved out a special rule for oil and gas leases with respect to the
formulation of the measure of expectation damages. And we can imagine no theoretical
reason for doing so.”).
13. Id. at *2.
14. Id. at *5.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *6.
18. Id. at *4.
19. 372 P.3d 690, 691 (Utah Ct. App. 2016).
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… per stirpes.” 20 The probate court issued a 1992 order finding that each
child of the testator “received a one-third life-estate interest in the mineral
rights and a one-third interest in the surface” of a 160-acre parcel of which
the testator died seized. 21 The devisees leased the oil and gas underlying
those 160 acres in 2008, and in 2014, one of the testator’s children
petitioned to reopen Mr. Womack’s estate to clarify who was entitled to
receive the proceeds from the 2008 lease. 22 The district court ruled that the
2014 petition to reopen the estate, by seeking to construe the will
differently than the 1992 order, was time-barred by the six month statute of
limitations applicable to petitions for vacation or modification of the final
order. 23
The petitioner timely appealed the trial court ruling and claimed that the
district court erred in its interpretation of the Probate Code, and because his
petition called for the court’s resolution of ambiguity in the order, it should
not be subject to the six-month limitations period.24 The Court of Appeals
of Utah upheld the lower court’s ruling, and in doing so explained the key
reasoning behind the petition: the life-estate holder is “entitled to enjoy the
land in the same manner as it was enjoyed before the creation of the life
estate.” 25 Therefore, if existing mineral extraction operations are being
conducted on the property at the time the life-estate is created, the life
tenant will be entitled to royalties payable under the lease; however, the life
tenant is not entitled to proceeds from mineral development commenced
after the creation of the life estate.26 In this case, the children were not
entitled to the royalty payments from the 2008 oil and gas lease, because it
was executed after the bequest of their life estate. Therefore, the
grandchildren-remaindermen were entitled to all proceeds derived from the
2008 oil and gas lease. Moreover, because the petition to reopen the estate
would result in a modification of the previous final order, the petition was
barred by the statute of limitations.

20. Id. at 692.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 692-93.
24. Id. at 693.
25. Id. at 694 (quoting 2 Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, §
513, at 654-55 (1989)).
26. Id. (citing 31 C.J.S. Estates § 49 (2015); Weekley v. Weekley, 27 S.E.2d 591, 593
(W. Va. 1943); Hynson v. Jefferies, 697 So.2d 792, 797 (Miss. Ct. App. 1997)).
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C. Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy v. Questar Gas Co.
In Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy v. Questar Gas Co.,
the Court of Appeals of Utah analyzed whether a local water district has
authority to regulate a public utility’s natural gas pipelines located within
the water district’s non-exclusive easements. 27 The Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake & Sandy (“District”) owns and operates the Salt Lake
Aqueduct (“SLA”), a water pipeline that delivers water from a reservoir to
a treatment plant and storage facilities. 28 The SLA was constructed between
1939 and 1951 within a non-exclusive easement reserved under an 1898
federal land patent.29 In 1955, after the construction of the SLA, the land
was dedicated to Salt Lake County for public use. 30 Questar Gas Company
(“Questar”) maintains a natural gas pipeline that runs parallel to, and in
places across, the SLA to provide gas supply to various homes in the area.31
Questar installed its pipeline pursuant to franchise agreements with Salt
Lake County, and also entered into a fifty-year license agreement with the
Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”).32 After the BOR quitclaimed the
easement area to the District, the license expired in December 2006 and the
District and Questar failed to negotiate a new agreement. 33 The District’s
own regulations require a license agreement for utility crossings of the
SLA. 34 After the failed negotiations with Questar, the District filed a
motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Questar pipeline belonged to the District, and that Questar’s continued use
of the pipeline constituted trespass and a public nuisance. 35 The District
further claimed that Questar’s pipeline unreasonably interfered with the
SLA and the District’s future plans for development within the SLA. 36 The
trial court denied the District’s motion and granted Questar’s motion to
dismiss, which the District promptly appealed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s ruling, holding that the
District lacked express or implied statutory authority to regulate a public

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

361 P.3d 709, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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utility’s natural gas pipeline located within its non-exclusive easement. 37
Unlike other governmental bodies, the District was never authorized to
regulate public utilities within its geographical reach,38 and is able to carry
out its duties and responsibilities without any need to regulate such
conduct. 39 The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s conclusion
that Questar’s pipeline did not unreasonably interfere with the District’s use
of the SLA due to the absence of evidence of past interference during their
sixty-year coexistence and the claimed interference with the District’s
future plans being mere speculation.40
III. Legislation
A. S. B. 17
Senate Bill 17, which became effective upon approval on March 28,
2016, amended various portions of the Utah oil and gas severance tax
statute. Namely, S. B. 17 adds the following definitions under Utah Code §
59-5-102(1)(a):
(a) "Royalty rate" means the percentage of the interests
described in Subsection (2)(b)(i) as defined by a contract
between the United States, the state, an Indian, or an Indian tribe
and the oil or gas producer.
(b) "Taxable value" means the total value of the oil or gas minus:
(i) any royalties paid to, or the value of oil or gas taken in kind
by, the interest holders described in Subsection (2)(b)(i); and (ii)
the total value of oil or gas exempt from severance tax under
Subsection (2)(b)(ii).
(c) "Taxable volume" means: (i) for oil, the total volume of
barrels minus: (A) for an interest described in Subsection
(2)(b)(i), the product of the royalty rate and the total volume of
barrels; and (B) the number of barrels that are exempt under
Subsection (2)(b)(ii); and (ii) for natural gas, the total volume of
37. Id. at 713-14.
38. See id. at 716 (“The District enjoys no statutory authority to regulate public utilities
comparable to the express statutory authority of UDOT, Salt Lake County, and Sandy
City.”).
39. Id. at 714 (“We do not see how the ability to regulate Questar and other public
utilities within the SLA corridor is necessary to the District’s ability to carry out its duties
and responsibilities.”).
40. Id. at 719.
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MCFs minus: (A) for an interest described in Subsection
(2)(b)(i), the product of the royalty rate and the total volume of
MCFs; and (B) the number of MCFs that are exempt under
Subsection (2)(b)(ii).
(d) "Total value" means the value, as determined by Section 595-103.1, of all oil or gas that is: (i) produced; and (ii) (A) saved;
(B) sold; or (C) transported from the field where the oil or gas
was produced.
(e) "Total volume" means: (i) for oil, the number of barrels: (A)
produced; and (B) (I) saved; (II) sold; or (III) transported from
the field where the oil was produced; and (ii) for natural gas, the
number of MCFs: (A) produced; and (B) (I) saved; (II) sold; or
(III) transported from the field where the natural gas was
produced.
(f) "Value of oil or gas taken in kind" means the volume of oil or
gas taken in kind multiplied by the market price for oil or gas at
the location where the oil or gas was produced on the date the oil
or gas was taken in kind.
S. B. 17 further clarified the application and calculation of the severance
tax in several ways, including but not limited to amendments to Utah Code
§ 59-5-102(2)(b) and –(3)(a)-(c), which now read as follows:
(2)(b) The severance tax imposed by Subsection (2)(a) does not
apply to: (i) an interest of: (A) the United States in oil or gas or
in the proceeds of the production of oil or gas; (B) the state or a
political subdivision of the state in oil or gas or in the proceeds
of the production of oil or gas; and (C) an Indian or Indian tribe
as defined in Section 9-9-101 in oil or gas or in the proceeds of
the production of oil or gas produced from land under the
jurisdiction of the United States; and (ii) the value of: (A) oil or
gas produced from stripper wells, unless the exemption prevents
the severance tax from being treated as a deduction for federal
tax purposes; (B) oil or gas produced in the first 12 months of
production for wildcat wells started after January 1, 1990; and
(C) oil or gas produced in the first six months of production for
development wells started after January 1, 1990.
(3)(a) The severance tax on oil shall be calculated as follows: (i)
dividing the taxable value by the taxable volume; (ii)(A)
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multiplying the rate described in Subsection (4)(a)(i) by the
portion of the figure calculated in Subsection (3)(a)(i) that is
subject to the rate described in Subsection (4)(a)(i); and (B)
multiplying the rate described in Subsection (4)(a)(ii) by the
portion of the figure calculated in Subsection (3)(a)(i) that is
subject to the rate described in Subsection (4)(a)(ii); (iii) adding
together the figures calculated in Subsections (3)(a)(ii)(A) and
(B); and (iv) multiplying the figure calculated in Subsection
(3)(a)(iii) by the taxable volume.
(b) The severance tax on natural gas shall be calculated as
follows: (i) dividing the taxable value by the taxable volume;
(ii)(A) multiplying the rate described in Subsection (4)(b)(i) by
the portion of the figure calculated in Subsection (3)(b)(i) that is
subject to the rate described in Subsection (4)(b)(i); and (B)
multiplying the rate described in Subsection (4)(b)(ii) by the
portion of the figure calculated in Subsection (3)(b)(i) that is
subject to the rate described in Subsection (4)(b)(ii); (iii) adding
together the figures calculated in Subsections (3)(b)(ii)(A) and
(B); and (iv) multiplying the figure calculated in Subsection
(3)(b)(iii) by the taxable volume.
(c) The severance tax on natural gas liquids shall be calculated
by multiplying the taxable value of the natural gas liquids by the
severance tax rate in Subsection (4)(c).
B. S. B. 134
Senate Bill 134 amended the Oil and Gas Conservation Account statute,
Utah Code § 40-6-14.5, with the relevant portions of the amended bill now
reading as follows:
(6)(a) The balance of the Oil and Gas Conservation Account at the end of
the fiscal year may not exceed 100% of the fiscal year appropriation for
Subsection 3(a).
(b) Any Excess money at the end of the fiscal year above the balance
limit established in Subsection (6)(a) shall be transferred to the general
fund. 41
This Senate Bill was approved on March 30, 2016, and effective as of
May 10, 2016. 42
41. S.B. 134, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016).
42. Id.
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C. S. B. 159
Senate Bill 159 extends the severance tax exemption, being Utah Code §
59-5-120, which was previously slated to end on June 30, 2016. 43 The new
expiration date is June 30, 2026. 44 The term “tar sands” was also amended
to read “oil sands.” 45 The text of the bill remains otherwise unchanged, and
now reads as follows: “Beginning on January 1, 2006, and ending on June
30, 2026, no severance tax required by this chapter is imposed on oil and
gas produced, saved, sold, or transported if the oil or gas produced, saved,
sold or transported is derived from: (1) coal-to-liquids technology; (2) oil
shale; or (3) oil sands.” 46 Senate Bill 159 was approved on March 28, 2016,
effective as of May 10, 2016. 47
D. H. B. 276
In 2012, the Utah legislature enacted the Transfer of Public Lands Act,
which required that “on or before December 31, 2014, the United States
shall (a) extinguish title to public lands; and (b) transfer title to public lands
to the state.” 48 Subsequently, in 2013, the Utah Legislature coordinated an
economic study to determine the feasibility of such a transfer.49 The study,
titled An Analysis of a Transfer of Federal Lands to the State of Utah, was
completed in November of 2014. 50
John C. Ruple and Robert B. Keiter, in a trio of white papers published
between October 2014 and December 2015, discussed both the legal and
economic implications of a land transfer, explain the results of the
economic study, and highlight three key drawbacks to Utah’s claim to
federal lands: (1) under the Property Clause of the Constitution of the
United States the federal government is entitled to authority over public
land, and Utah accepted this authority as a condition to statehood;51 (2)
43. S.B. 159, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. UTAH CODE ANN. §63L-6-103 (West 2016).
49. PUBLIC LANDS POLICY COORDINATING OFFICE AMENDMENTS, 2013
Utah Laws Ch. 337 (H.B. 142).
50. Jan Elise Stabro, An Analysis of a Transfer of Federal Lands to the State of Utah 1784 (2014), http://gardner.utah.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/1.-Land-Transfer-AnalysisFinal-Report.pdf.
51. Robert B. Keiter and John C. Ruple, A Legal Analysis of the Transfer of Public
Lands Movement, Stegner Center White Paper 2014-02 (Oct. 7, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2516004.
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state management of public lands would be just as inefficient as federal
management of the same, and would likely not be profitable; 52 and, (3) a
transfer of federal land would likely not include the subsurface minerals,
which would be the state’s primary source of revenue from those lands. 53
Despite the above hurdles, the state has taken steps toward bringing suit
against the federal government in order to gain authority over federal lands
in Utah; however, as of this writing, no suit has been filed. Nonetheless,
Utah passed H.B. 276 this year, which enacted the Utah Public Land
Management Act, as well as several other bills related to public land
transfers. 54 The bill includes mineral exploration and production among the
primary goals of the act, 55 calls for the development of land use plans to
ensure efficient development and conservation of public lands,56 and
creates several funds to aid with public land management. 57 Notably, H.B.
276 becomes effective on the day the state receives title to at least 100,000
acres of public land from the federal government pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63L-8-103. As explained above, the state is yet to receive federal
lands under this section and thus the Utah Land Management Act is (and
perhaps will remain) on the shelf.

52. Robert B. Keiter and John C. Ruple, The Transfer of Public Lands Movement:
Taking the ‘Public’ Out of Public Lands, Stegner Center White Paper 2015-01 (Jan. 28,
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2555922.
53. Robert B. Keiter and John C. Ruple, When Winning Means Losing: Why a State
Takeover of Public Lands May Leave States Without the Mineral Rights They Covet, Stegner
Center White Paper 2015-02 (Dec. 9, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2701292.
54. H.B. 276, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016); see also Commission for the Stewardship of
Public Lands and Private Donations for Public Lands Litigation, H .B. 287, 2016 Gen. Sess.
(Utah 2016); Public Lands Act Amendments, H.B. 105, 2015 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015);
Legislative Approval of Land Transfers, H.B. 303, 2015 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015); Evaluating
Federal Land, S.B. 48, 2015 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015); Interstate Compact on Transfer of
Federal Lands Amendments, H.B. 132, 2015 Gen Sess. (Utah 2015).
55. UTAH CODE ANN. §63L-8-103 (West 2016).
56. UTAH CODE ANN. §63L-8-202 (West 2016).
57. See UTAH CODE ANN. §63L-8-307, §63L-8-308, §63L-8-309, §63L-8-310 (West
2016).
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